[INFRA-772] fix(security): stop trusting body-supplied created_by/created_at on external API - #9704
[INFRA-772] fix(security): stop trusting body-supplied created_by/created_at on external API#9704mguptahub wants to merge 3 commits into
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…ated_at on external API Three duplicate/related reports, one mechanism: POST/PATCH handlers for work items, comments and issue links let a caller set created_by and created_at directly from the request body, even though the model already auto-populates created_by correctly on create (BaseModel.save() reads the authenticated user via crum). The escalation: forge created_by via PATCH on an existing issue, then pass IssueDetailAPIEndpoint.delete's "admin OR creator" gate as a plain project member — deleting arbitrary work items. Root cause had two independent halves: - Four view-level blocks (issue POST, issue PUT's external-id upsert create branch, comment POST, issue-link POST) re-fetched the row a serializer.save() had just correctly created — turning it into an UPDATE, where BaseModel.save()'s auto-created_by protection does not apply — then overwrote created_by/created_at straight from request.data. All four removed entirely; the initial serializer.save() already produces the right created_by unaided. - IssueSerializer never marked created_by read-only (unlike updated_by right beside it, and unlike created_at, which Django's auto_now_add protects independently). That let a plain PATCH on an *existing* issue set created_by directly via the serializer — this is what actually makes the delete-escalation chain possible, since PATCH never touched the view-level override blocks at all. Added to IssueSerializer.Meta.read_only_fields. Comment and issue-link PATCH already used properly-protected serializers (created_by already read-only, or absent from fields entirely) — their only gap was the POST-path override, now removed. Verified via fail-before: reverted the fix, 5 of 6 new tests correctly failed (forged attacker-controlled created_by landing in the DB); the 2 that passed regardless are intentional (a same-value no-op and a positive control). Confirmed IssueDetailAPIEndpoint.put has no route mounted anywhere (only ["get", "post"] on IssueListCreateAPIEndpoint) — cleaned up the same override there for consistency, but it's unreachable dead code, not a live vector. Tests: 6 new (apps/api/plane/tests/contract/api/test_created_by_forgery.py). Broader regression sweep (issue/comment/link/notification suites, 49 tests) green. ruff clean. Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
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Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 10 included reviews per hour; 7 remain after this review. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe API now preserves authenticated creator attribution for issues, comments, and issue links. Issue updates cannot change ChangesCreator attribution protection
Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to The PR prevents external API callers from forging authorship or timestamps; no actionable merge-blocking risk remains at the current head after normal checks and review. Suggested reviewers: 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
Full details: Description checkExplanation The description provides a detailed root-cause analysis, explains the security impact, identifies the affected endpoints and serializer, and documents targeted and regression test results. It does not use every template heading or provide a linked reference, but the required information is substantially present.
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Pull request overview
This PR closes an external-API security gap where clients could forge authorship (and in some paths timestamps) by sending created_by/created_at in request bodies for work items, comments, and issue links—enabling a PATCH-then-DELETE escalation via “admin OR creator” authorization.
Changes:
- Removed view-level “refetch then overwrite
created_by/created_atfromrequest.data” blocks in issue create/upsert-create, comment create, and issue-link create endpoints. - Hardened
IssueSerializerby markingcreated_byas read-only to prevent PATCH-based reattribution. - Added contract regression tests covering issue create, issue patch reattribution attempts, the patch→delete escalation chain, comment create, and issue-link create.
Reviewed changes
Copilot reviewed 3 out of 3 changed files in this pull request and generated 3 comments.
| File | Description |
|---|---|
| apps/api/plane/api/views/issue.py | Removes body-trusting override blocks so create paths rely on server-side audit field assignment. |
| apps/api/plane/api/serializers/issue.py | Adds created_by to read_only_fields to block PATCH-based creator forgery. |
| apps/api/plane/tests/contract/api/test_created_by_forgery.py | Adds regression coverage for created_by forgery and the delete escalation chain. |
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Three findings, all in the test file: - Module docstring referenced test_patch_then_delete_forgery_chain_is_blocked, which doesn't exist — the actual test is test_patch_then_delete_is_still_403_for_a_plain_member. - Issue-create and comment-create tests only asserted created_by wasn't forged, not created_at, even though the same removed override blocks covered both fields. Added a 10-years-back forged created_at to each POST body and asserted it lands nowhere near that value. Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
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Addressed both Copilot findings in 8294c65:
All 6 tests still green. |
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Pull request overview
Copilot reviewed 3 out of 3 changed files in this pull request and generated no new comments.
Suppressed comments (2)
Previously missed (1) — in code that hasn't changed since the last review.
apps/api/plane/api/views/issue.py:1183
- The link is re-fetched from the database immediately after serializer.save(), but the view only needs the just-created instance for actor_id and the response. This adds an unnecessary query on every link create request.
This issue also appears on line 1461 of the same file.
if serializer.is_valid():
serializer.save(project_id=project_id, issue_id=issue_id)
crawl_work_item_link_title.delay(serializer.instance.id, serializer.instance.url)
link = IssueLink.objects.get(pk=serializer.instance.id)
issue_activity.delay(
apps/api/plane/api/views/issue.py:1465
- The comment is re-fetched from the database right after serializer.save(), but the view only uses it for created_by_id and serialization. Using serializer.instance avoids an extra query on every comment create request.
if serializer.is_valid():
serializer.save(project_id=project_id, issue_id=issue_id, actor=request.user)
issue_comment = IssueComment.objects.get(pk=serializer.instance.id)
issue_activity.delay(
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Actionable comments posted: 1
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Inline comments:
In `@apps/api/plane/tests/contract/api/test_created_by_forgery.py`:
- Around line 148-150: Update the timestamp assertions in the created-record
checks at both locations to require each stored timestamp to be within a small
tolerance of the request time, rather than merely later than FORGED_CREATED_AT
plus one day. Preserve the existing anti-backdating intent while applying the
same request-time proximity validation to both assertions.
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apps/api/plane/tests/contract/api/test_created_by_forgery.py
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>FORGED_CREATED_AT + timedelta(days=1) only proved the value wasn't the exact forged timestamp (or within a day of it) — a stale-but-different value would still pass. Replaced with a tolerance window around the actual request time, applied identically to both the issue-create and comment-create tests via a shared helper. Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
Summary
Three duplicate/related security reports, one mechanism: the external API's POST/PATCH handlers for work items, comments and issue links let a caller set
created_by/created_atdirectly from the request body. Any project member (including Guest) can forge authorship and backdate timestamps.Escalation chain: forge
created_byvia PATCH on an existing issue, then passIssueDetailAPIEndpoint.delete's "admin OR creator" gate as a plain member — deleting arbitrary work items with only Member-level access.Root cause — two independent halves
1. View-level override blocks (issue POST, issue PUT's external-id upsert create branch, comment POST, issue-link POST) re-fetched a row
serializer.save()had just correctly created — turning it into an update, whereBaseModel.save()'s auto-created_byprotection (which reads the authenticated user viacrum) only applies on create — then overwrotecreated_by/created_atstraight fromrequest.data. All four removed entirely; the initialserializer.save()already produces the correctcreated_byunaided, no replacement logic needed.2.
IssueSerializernever markedcreated_byread-only — unlikeupdated_byright beside it in the same list, and unlikecreated_at, which Django'sauto_now_addprotects independently. That gap is what actually made the delete-escalation chain possible: a plainPATCHon an existing issue could setcreated_bydirectly through the serializer, without touching any of the view-level override blocks at all. Added toIssueSerializer.Meta.read_only_fields.Comment and issue-link
PATCHalready used properly-protected serializers (created_byalready read-only, or absent fromfieldsentirely) — their only gap was thePOST-path override, now removed.Verification
IssueDetailAPIEndpoint.puthas no route mounted anywhere inapps/api/plane/api/urls/work_item.py(IssueListCreateAPIEndpointis only ever registered with["get", "post"], in bothold_url_patternsandnew_url_patterns) — cleaned up the same override there for consistency, but it's unreachable dead code, not a live vector, so no test for it.test_issues.py,test_issue_notifications.py,test_cycle_issue_app.py,test_issue_list_guest_scope_app.py,test_issue_comment_modal.py,test_issue_recent_visit.py,test_work_item_link_task.py— 49 tests, all green.ruff checkclean on all changed files.Tests
apps/api/plane/tests/contract/api/test_created_by_forgery.py— 6 new tests covering issue create, issue patch (both a same-value no-op control and a genuine reattribution attempt), the full patch-then-delete escalation chain (plus a positive control for the legitimate creator-delete path), comment create, and issue-link create.Co-authored-by: Plane AI noreply@plane.so
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